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Abstract:  Due to special properties of moral hazard and adverse selection in health 
insurance contract, governments’ effort to efficiently provide health care services to 
their citizens tends to encounter many problems, especially in low income countries. 
The National Health Insurance of Ghana has not been immune to this problem. This 
paper, explores empirical research to test for the asymmetric information problem of 
moral hazard and adverse selection in health insurance contracts. It uses both 
quantitative and qualitative to analyze data gathered through a meaningfully 
administered questionnaire in the Sekyere West District of Ghana to make its 
conclusion on the subject matter.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
According to mainstream health-care economists, special properties of health service 
delivery-asymmetric information problem of adverse selection and moral hazard, make health care 
different from other goods (Carlstrom 1994). Because of these properties, governments’ effort to 
efficiently provide health care services to its people tends to encounter many problems, especially in low 
income countries. Since the implementation of the National Health Insurance Schemes (NHISs) by the 
government of Ghana in 2005, though membership registration is estimated to have reached fifty-five 
percent of the population, the cost of financing has increased to the extent of some schemes resulting in 
financial distress. This can be attributed to moral hazard and adverse selection problem among others. 
Asymmetrical information means that the distribution of information between buyers and/or sellers is 
skewed, i.e. not equal. Information asymmetry models assume that at least one party to a transaction has 
relevant information whereas the other(s) do not. In the health insurance industry, sellers/providers 
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(governments in this case) do not have the same information as consumers. As discussed by most 
scholars and practitioners I emphasized in this paper that, the half twin of this problem is moral hazard.  
Moral hazard is defined as the effect of insurance on the behavior of the insured. More broadly, moral 
hazard occurs when the party with more information about its actions or intentions has a tendency or 
incentive to behave inappropriately from the perspective of the party with less information. In health 
insurance, because individuals no longer bear the cost of medical services after acquiring insurance, they 
have an added incentive to ask for pricier and more elaborate medical service, which otherwise may not 
be necessary. In these instances, individuals have an incentive to over consume, simply because they no 
longer bear the full cost of medical services. On the other hand, the term adverse selection as originally 
used in insurance describes a situation where an individual's demand for insurance (either the propensity 
to buy insurance, or the quantity purchased, or both) is positively correlated with the individual's risk of 
loss (e.g. higher risks buy more insurance), and the insurer is unable to allow for this correlation in the 
price of insurance. With respect to medical care, this means that insurers generally refuse coverage to all 
but the very healthy. One possible explanation for this is the transaction costs involved with writing 
policies for high risk patients (Glied & Remier, 2002).  
 
2.  THE LITERATURE  
 
The empirical test of the asymmetric information problem of moral hazard and adverse selection has in 
recent years catch the intellectual analysis of many scholars. Whiles some researchers use health or life 
insurance data, others analyze automobile insurance contracts.  
On their part, Holly, Lucien and Gianfranco (1998) estimates a structural model of health insurance, 
where the existence of a complete coverage, described by a dummy variable, is allowed to impact health 
expenditures in addition to a possible correlation between error terms. Estimating a parametric version of 
the model, they suggest that the former effect can be interpreted as moral hazard, whereas the second 
represents adverse selection. Though the robustness of the qualitative results with respect to changes in 
the parametric assumptions (and in particular the form of the distribution) is a difficult issue in this 
context, they made a positive finding in their hypothesis with regards to the presence of information 
asymmetry.  
In a related but different approach, Cardon, James, and Hendel (2001) exploit an interesting feature 
of employer-provided health insurance contracts. They emphasize that, while workers may, in any 
particular firm, be proposed one or several contractual options, the menus offered widely differ across 
companies. Assuming that the choice of an employer is not primarily driven by the characteristics of the 
associated health insurance plan, Cardon, James and Hendel argue that these data provide a 
‘quasi-natural experiment’, in the sense that similar agents turn out to be facing different (menus of) 
contracts for exogenous reasons. Then the existence of adverse selection they tested using the 
self-selection of agents among the various contracts of a given menu, whereas the estimation of moral 
hazard relies on the differences between the menus proposed by different firms. Again, although the 
estimation idea is in principle non-parametric, they construct and estimate a fully parametric model.  
In a more recent study, Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) developed a test for adverse selection that 
avoids the limitation of heterogeneity in risk preferences. Their test is based on using data on observable 
characteristics of individuals that are correlated with the outcomes but are not used by insurers in pricing 
contracts. 
Although the works of the above literature might not have a direct correlation with this paper, with 
respect to the different approaches and methodologies adopted by the various authors, their findings and 
academic marks remains prudent to this work. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach to 
assessing the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection in health insurance markets. My approach is 
based on exploring quantitative and qualitative analysis to examine consumer demand for health 
insurance, motivation behind the quest for health insurance, and health service utilization.  
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3. THE NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE OF GHANA: 
OVERVIEW 
 
Health care financing in Ghana has gone through many dynamics recognizing free health care at the eve 
of independence, introduction of the nominal fee in the 1970s, and the 1980s’ full cost recovery, 
popularly known as the “cash and carry” system. Recognizing the problems that the cash and carry 
system posed to accessing health care, the government of Ghana declared its intention to abolish the 
system, and began exploring the feasibility of introducing a national health insurance scheme to be 
managed at the district level. (Sulzbach, S, Garshong, B and Banahene, G) 
In August 2003, the government of Ghana moved from planning to action by passing the National 
Health Insurance Act. Its primary goal was to improve access to quality basic health care services in 
Ghana through the establishment of district-level Mutual Health Organizations (MHOs) or district-wide 
insurance schemes. They are regulated by the National Health Insurance Council (NHIC). The role of the 
NHIC is to register, license, and regulate health insurance schemes and to accredit and monitor health 
care providers operating under the schemes (Government of Ghana 2004). To mobilize additional funds 
to support implementation of the district mutual health insurance schemes, the government of Ghana 
instituted a National Insurance Levy of 2.5 percent on specific goods and services. In addition, 2.5 
percent of the 17.5 percent social security contributions paid by formal sector employees are 
automatically diverted to support the NHIS, and they and their dependants automatically enrolled in their 
district schemes. Approximately 80 percent of the NHIS is financed by these taxes. For those in the 
informal sector, community health insurance committees categorizes residents into social groups based 
on economic status, and those identified as ‘core poor’ are exempted from paying premiums 
(Government of Ghana 2004).  
 
4.  DATA, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The paper employs a simple empirical test for the presence and significance of the asymmetry 
information problem of moral hazard and adverse selection in the operations of the NHISs in Ghana. It 
uses a meaningfully designed questionnaire to gather information related to the subject matter. The study 
population comprises residents of the Sekyere West District in the Ashanti Region of Ghana.  
This non-random sampling technique was employed because I was without doubt that the chosen 
sample frame has fair knowledge about the activities of the national health insurance in the district.  
Out of a total of four hundred questionnaires administered, three hundred were obtained for the 
necessary corrections and computations to be made. My working hypotheses are:  
First, people who purchased insurance are more likely to have a higher consumption rate of health 
care services than people without insurance;  
Second, people purchase insurance due to their inferior health status or expected future high 
consumption rate.  
Though the NHIS in Ghana is mandatory, half of the population is not registered. This makes the 
comparison of health care utilization between insured and uninsured people meaningful. Besides, I 
observe the number of visits and how frequent people with health insurance visit, compared to when they 
were not insured. Finally, the presence of the large number of exempt people enables the identification of 
the two types of asymmetric information effects. Recall that people who are exempt from paying 
premium essentially enjoy the same coverage as people who pay premium but completely free of charge. 
So for this people there is no self-selection bias, i.e. no adverse selection effect. So for this people the 
excessive consumption of medical care should be the result of pure moral hazard effect. Contrary to this, 
for people who actually pay insurance premium, their behavior when it comes to health care 
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consumption will be impacted by both adverse selection effect (they bought the insurance because of 
their inferior health), and moral hazard (having the insurance changed their behavior relative to when 
they were uninsured).  
 
4.  ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
4.1  TABLES AND INTERPRETATIONS 
The study has explored a random sampling method in the Sekyere West District Assembly of Ghana 
without preference to age, sex and employment status. For age however, only those within the matured 
age (18 and above) were considered. The findings are therefore interpreted below. I must acknowledge 
that all figures have been computed in percentage.    
From table 4.1, the survey recorded a significant larger number of insured respondents than 
uninsured respondents. According to the gender distribution of the insured, more than half of the 
respondents are female in their reproductive age against 30% of male insured respondents. This could be 
attributed to the mere fact that women are more vulnerable to sickness and for that matter seek to take 
precaution against cost of health care utilization by enrolling in the insurance scheme. Besides, they 
could have sought for insurance after pregnancy as most of these women fall within their reproductive 
age and have dependants as well. In either way, this is a case of adverse selection. Additional analysis 
explored the age distribution of respondents. There exist vast differences between the percentages of 
insured and uninsured in all the categories. For instance, the survey recognized a large number of 
uninsured respondents in the active age (19-45) category. This group of people is generally seen to be 
healthier and such don’t pay much attention to health issues hence the low number recorded. However, 
among the 70s and above, because they enjoy insurance without paying premium, not much can be said 
about the differences between both insured and uninsured. The significant differences between the 
insured and uninsured in the 46-49 ages category can as well be attributed to the problem of adverse 
selection. Focusing on employment factors of respondents, it is recorded that none of the public workers 
observed was uninsured. This is due to the fact that premiums of public servants are deducted by the 
government from their social security and as such makes it mandatory. For private workers the big 
differences between insured and uninsured could be the fact that they might belong to other private 
insurance companies or as a result of economic status as in the unemployed.  
Table 4.2 highlights patterns in health service accessibility among both insured and uninsured in a 
year. Of particular interest is whether enrollment in a health insurance scheme increases access and 
utilization of health care services or not. Much emphasis is placed on the health care utilization pattern of 
the insured. The survey reveals that respondents with insurance visited a physician more frequently in a 
year than do uninsured respondents. More than 50 percent of the insured visits the physician or a hospital 
more than trice in a year. This observation has two implications. On one hand, these people might have 
acquired health insurance due to the poor nature of their health status, hence a clear evidence of adverse 
selection. On the other hand, respondents’ rate of healthcare consumption increased after acquiring the 
insurance which could be attributed to mere moral hazards. 
Table 4.3 seeks to examine the motivation behind the quest for insurance among the insured. 
Respondents were asked about what motivated them to register for the insurance. The qualitative 
implication shows that some registered after being sick and also after pregnancy. This exhibits adverse 
selection. For those whose registration was as result of mandatory it is observed that all of them fall 
under the public workers category and had no choice since their premium is deducted from source by the 
government. Most interesting observation is the result on their healthcare consumption status both 
before and after registration. The result shows that most respondents visit a physician once in a year 
before registration. However, the pattern of visits changed totally after registration. For instance, after 
registration, it is observed more than 50 percent visit a physician more than three times in a year. This 
obviously has two implications. Significantly, they probably acquired the insurance as a result of their 
poor health status hence adverse selection, and/or their consumption pattern changed as a result of moral 
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hazard. 
 
4.2. MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE NHIS 
The findings presented in this research provide a baseline for testing the information asymmetry problem 
of moral hazard and adverse selection in health insurance contract, using the National Health Insurance 
Scheme of Ghana as a case study. The information collected both on insured and uninsured centers on 
the reasons behind registering for a health insurance and the consumption pattern of the insured, both 
before and after insurance. The study’s hypotheses revolve around the opinion that the national health 
insurance in Ghana is not immune to the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard.  
The study found that insured respondents in the survey sought for healthcare services in a year than 
their uninsured counterparts. Insured respondents also significantly revealed vast differences in health 
care utilization after they were insured than before insurance. More than 50 percent utilized healthcare 
services more than three times within a year as compared to 11 percent of same respondent utilizing 
health care at the same time period before they had health insurance. The findings in this report reveals 
evidence of adverse selection, that’s they acquired the insurance as a result of their expected future 
utilization of healthcare services. Moral hazard implication is also vividly evident looking at the high 
rate of health care utilization by insured respondents, and also compared to when they were not insured. 
The study found evidence of adverse selection through analysis of the background data of 
respondents. First, the survey found more women, majority in their reproductive age and with 
dependants, who mostly registered after they found pregnant. Secondly, respondents within the ages 
46-69 and adults over the age of 50 were significantly more likely to be enrolled, and those within the 
age range of 18 and 45 were significantly less likely to be enrolled in an insurance scheme. This suggests 
that individuals from higher-risk groups were more inclined to join the scheme, whereas those at lesser 
risk were less inclined to join. In a nut shell, the two hypotheses of the study have been proven positive. 
Indeed, people who purchased insurance are more likely to have a higher consumption rate of health care 
services than people without insurance, and people purchase insurance due to their inferior health status 
or expected future high consumption rate. There is therefore evidence of moral hazard and adverse 
selection in Ghana’s health insurance. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
NHIS 
 
This study has attempted to capture information related to health care utilization and health insurance 
registration for its qualitative and quantitative analysis in examining the asymmetric information 
problem of moral hazard and adverse selection in the NHIS of Ghana. It is envisaged that the results of 
this study will be of great importance to the government of Ghana as it continues to implement the policy. 
In the long term, mandatory enrollment in the NHIS could minimize the impact of adverse selection and 
help pool the risk. In the short term, I suggest an introduction of risk rating to minimize the effect of 
adverse selection. For moral hazard, there is the need to introduce a policy of cost-sharing to curb the 
situation. However, there is the need to consider the socio-economic of the policy. Systematic analyses 
of other countries’ health insurance systems especially that of advance countries would also be very 
useful. The academic relevance of the study has been the application of empirical study to test for the 
problem of moral hazard and adverse selection and its contribution to the literature. The design called for 
conducting a subsequent round of surveys with a wider coverage. Such a survey could capture increases 
in insurance enrollment, as well as the effects of enrollment on health care seeking behavior and out-of 
pocket expenditures. In addition, a subsequent survey could complement district MHO data by providing 
insights on respondents’ perceptions of the NHIS, and for the uninsured, reasons for not enrolling.  
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TABLES 
Table 4.1   Respondents’ Background and Employment in Percentage 
 
 No.(%) Sex Age Employment 
Male Female 18-45 46-69 70 ≥ Public 
Workers 
Private 
Workers 
Unemployed
Insured 1.00 0.30 0.70 0.21 0.45 0.34 0.46 0.09 0.44
Uninsured 1.00 0.78 0.22 0.60 0.22 0.18 - 0.55 0.45
 
Table 4.2  Respondents’ Health Care Accessibility Status 
 
  Number of Visits to a Physician in a Year 
 No. (%) Once per Year Twice Per Year Trice Per Year More than trice per Tear 
Insured 1.00 0.09 0.15 0.25 0.51 
Uninsured 1.00 0.47 0.33 0.13 0.07 
 
Table 4.3  Determinants and Health Care Consumption of Insured 
 
Motivation behind 
Registration 
No. 
(%) 
After Sickness After Pregnancy Mandatory Self Motivated 
1.00 0.21 0.12 0.30 0.37 
Visits to a Physician 
Before Registration 
 
1.00 
Once per Year Twice Per Year Trice Per Year More than Trice Per Year
0.41 0.27 0.21 0.11 
Visits to a Physician 
After Registration 
1.00 Once per Year   Twice Per Year Trice Per Year More than Trice Per Year 
0.09 0.15 0.25 0.51 
